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The Ego in Germanic Philosophy: 
A Reexamination 
Robert C. Solomon 
Himself as Everything. How does Mrs. Fichte put up 
with it? 
Heinrich Heine, parodying a common misconception 
of Fichte's philosophy. 
The notion that knowledge can discover anything 
.. .is disregarded altogether: for there is nothing to 
discover, and even if there was mind could not reach 
it; it could only reach the idea it might call up from 
its own depths ... Under the fashionable name of pro­
gress what these idealists sincerely treasure is the vital 
joy of transition; and usually the j'oy of this transi­
tion lies much more in shedding their present state 
than in attaining a better one. For they suffer and 
wrestle continually, and by a curious and deeply 
animal instinct, they hug and sanctify this endless 
struggle all the more when it rends and bewilders 
them, bravely declaring it to be the absolute, infinte 
and divine. 
George Santayana, "Egotism in German Philosophy" 
It was two thirds of a century ago, when things German and German 
philosophy in particular were- to put it politely- not particularly 
amenable to American thought, that George Santayana wrote his bel­
ligerent and sometimes insightful study of the post Kantian era: 
"Egotism in German Philosophy,, he called it, and the preface (if not 
already the title) makes it quite clear that this was no scholarly exposi­
tion.Post-Kantian German philosophy, he suggested, was nothing but 
a combination of skepticism and patriotic arrogance. The arrogance of 
German philosophy, he argued, had turned the Germans into uhea .. 
thens" with unprecedented pretensions to genius and world-historical 
importance, the fruits of which were evident in the (first) world war. 
The theory of knowledge was in fact "a screen behind which the 
German Will could have its day." In conclusion and by way of con­
trast, Santayana urges us on to "courtesy in the universe ... and in 
,everything discarding the word absolute as most false and the most 
odious of words." 1 
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Santayana's indictment seems not to have perturbed the current 
generation of scholars of German idealism, though it did effectively 
discourage �eral prior generations from reading the German idealists 
at all. But Santayana's admittedly excessive accusations have a point 
to them which endures and becomes more evident as we move further 
away in time from the horrible cataclysm caused by that particular 
arrogance (not unique to German royalty) of the first decades of the 
century. The point is that, beneath rhe often brilliant speculations of 
Kant and his followers, there lurks a geopolitical arrogance, not war­
like, necessarily, but unjust, obnoxious and dangerous nevertheless. 
Today we call it "cultural imperialism.'' and it is by no means limited 
to philosophy in Germany. In philosophy, I refer to it as "the trans­
cendental pretense''- and it is just as evident in the current American 
philosophical hegemony as it was in Kant, Hegel and their idealist 
kin. 2 
I would Hice to go bade over some of the same turf covered by San­
tayana, in much the same survey style but with much more sympathy, 
and look once again at the ego- if not e·xactly egotism-in Germanic 
philosophy. In today's world, the debate would more likely be cen .. 
tered around the question of" relativism"- that is, the thesis that all 
knowledge is relative to some conceptual framework. In nineteenth 
century idealist terms, we might say that it is rather relative to the ego 
that provides that conceptual framework. In the following essay, it is 
this question that will concern me, not Santayana's admittedly 
delightful anti-hagiography. But I should like to go back over the same 
territory, and provide a somewhat different interpretation of the 
movement from Kant to recent continental philosophy. At the same 
time, I should like to make sure that always in the foreground is the 
problem that was not and still is not taken sufficiently seriously either 
in America or in Europe- the problem of cultural imperialism 
which, I believe, follows indirectly if not directly from the egocentric 
standpoint that was developed by the German philosophers. The ego 
in German philosophy was not only pretentious, as Santayana insisted 
in his blunt Victorian manner; it is also politically insidious, an 
implicit warrant for ignoring not only other philosophies but other 
cultures, other countries, other people. 
Today, relativisrn is at least an arguable position, if not "fashion­
able" (according to Karl Popper); the burden of proof seems to lie on 
the side of those who would deny its intelligibility. But the pictu.re 
then was entirely otherwise; relativism was considered an absurdity 
and "the Absolute" reigned over German philosophy. The key figure 
in this story, of course, is G.W.F. Hegel, the best known spokesman 
for .. the Absolute" but also, I want to argue, the prime mover of the 
development of historical relativism, or simply, .. historicism". But in 
this he was helped out enormously by Kant, even more of a defender 
of the Absolute Truth than Hegel. Between them (which includes 
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such intermediary figures as Fichte and Schelling), they turned what 
began in KanlC as a powerful argument for the singularity of knowledge 
into an argument that can best be summarized as the recognition that 
"alternative conceptual frameworks" are indeed an unavoidable phi­
losophical conclusion. 
And yet, not only Kant and Hegel, but virtually all of the philo­
sophers who followed them denied this conclusion. Kant rejected it, 
of course. But before him, Johann Herder, the precocious cultural 
relativist, nevertheless shrunk from the gen.eral relativist thesis in the 
name of a single, all-embracing "humanity."'3 Hegel considered relati­
vism absurd, for somewhat the same reasons that Donald Davidson 
now does; and judging from his somewhat embarrassed looks back at 
his early Phen.omenology of Spirir, in which he displayed his own histor­
icism at its best, he came to have a horror of what some have taken to 
be his main philosophicai contribution. Later in the century, Dilthey 
flirted with relativism but rejected it at uncomfortably dose quarters; 
Karl Mannheim, whose "sociology of knowledge" is generally taken 
as one of the examples of relativism, refused the idea with indigna­
tion, insisting on calling himself a "relationist" instead. Even Fried­
rich Nietzsche, who embraced relativism in its most extreme forms, 
couldn't resist the temptation to announce relativism itself as the 
Absolute truth, thus emerging with some sometimes bizarre dedara .. 
tions about "truth is falsity" and the like. And as we enter this cen­
tury, we find Edmund Husserl, battling against Dilthey in particular, 
still fighting a rear-guard reactionary action. against the encroaching 
forces of relativism. 4 
My strategy in this essay is to look at a single theme - the early 
struggle against what we now call relativism (then, "historicism") in 
the name of 1•the transcendental pretense''-the still common but no 
longer wholly respectable tendency to project one's own view of the 
world as a universal or "transcendental" truth, as the way the world 
really is. The strategy is worth pointing out, for it should be made 
clear how the question has become reversed: Kant desperately 
searched for an argument that would prove the singularity of knowl­
edge (since this was, wasn't it, the only intelligible conclusion?). I 
want to ask instead whether there is any reason for us to think that 
our views of the world, however demonstrably "necessary," are any­
thing more than that? In other words, is the transcendental pretense 
anything more than just that-a pretense? 
Kant's Revolution and The Transcendental Pretense 
"The transcendental pretense" is the attempt to claim that one's 
own world view is in fact the only correct world view, for any person 
in any society at any time. But such a pretense, in one important 
sense, is an entirely new phenomenon, dating (rather precisely) from 
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the end of the Eighteenth Century. So long as people believed that 
there was simply .. the world," exLSting independently of all human 
experience, the claim that there is only one correct world view 
(whether or not one's own) was unimpeachable. This was no pre, 
tense, only common sense. There was nothing "transcendental" about 
it; it was just "the way the world is." Absolutism too, therefore, was a 
matter of common sense, hardly a position at all. There may have 
been serious questions about which world view was the correct one, 
and which authorities should be believed, but relativism, until very 
recently, was not even an intelligible suggestion. 
Intellectual historians tend to mark changes in epochs overly 
sharply, sometimes attributing vast changes in viewpoint to a single 
author or book. Allow me co join in this oversimplification. The phi­
losopher is lmmanual Kant, and the book his Cricique of Pure Rea.son 
of 1781. s His "Copernican revolution" was in fact the culmination of 
a series of bold steps in modern thinking, beginning more or less with 
Galileo and Descartes (another oversimplification), moving through 
the intrigues and internecine battles of European rationalism and Brit­
ish empiricism with the anthropocentric: confidence of the Englight, 
enment, of which Kant is generally recognized as one of the leading 
proponents. A familiar way of summarizing this series of moves, is to 
call it a shift to "subjectivity."6 This does not do justice to some of 
the most important participants in the series (e.g. Spinoza), and it has 
the obvious danger of ignoring the fact ·that this move was in every 
case an attempt to secure an objective view of" the way the world is." 
But the idea of "subjectivity" displays well enough the tendency to 
move away from a glib acceptance of the idea that the world is 11a cer­
tain way," independent of our experience of it. And, at the same time, 
it opens up the intelligibility of relativism, for world views are now 
anchored in, if not wholly constituted by, the "subjects" that hold 
them. (In careless contemporary parlance, "It's all relative" and "It's 
all subjective" are roughly synonymous, equally platitudinous, and 
equally conducive to the intellectual sloth they rationalize.) 
Before Kant, modern philosophers continued to hold onto "the 
way the world is" and launched momentous efforts to show how it 
could be that we know the way it is. Descartes developed a skeptical 
method that set the tone for much of the philosophy that followed. 
Hume demonstrated that such skeptical methods ended in skepticism 
as well. But what was not doubted by any of them was the idea rhat 
there is a way that the world is. (There were, of course, important 
theories which denied the existence of a distinct material world,, by 
Leibniz and Bishop Berkeley, for example, but they nevertheless main, 
tained the idea of "the way the world is" determined by God.) It is 
Kant who marks the beginning of the end of this old commonsensical 
idea. His "Copernican revolution" is an anthropocentric shift from 
the question, "How can we know the way the world is?" to an analy-
5
Solomon: The Ego in Germanic Philosophy: A Reexamination
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1987
The Ego in Germani- Philosophy 9 
sis of the way the world muse be according to the forms of human sen­
si biliry and the rules of human understanding. It is important that, as 
the above description leaves explicit, Kant continued to believe that 
there is "the way" the world is. But his shift in perspective from the 
way the world is to the structures through which we uconstitute" the 
world as it is already undermines the traditional view. 
Kant was a revolutionary, but like most revolutionaries, he was 
unsure of the new ground he had "liberated," and he preferred to stay 
safely on the familiar terrain of tradition. Kant's achievement was so 
great that it was almost incomprehensible. In a technical sense, it 
marked the destruction of metaphysics and epistemology as they had 
been practiced for centuries. But more importantly, he succeeded in 
bringing to its ultimate fruition that anthropocentric urge which had 
been present in philosophy since Socrates. Not only would humanity 
receive central attention (as in Socrates and. the modern enlighten­
ment), but even the nature of Reality itself was now viewed as 
dependent upon human faculties of knowledge. And this does not 
mean (as in Plato and virtually every philosopher since) that these 
human faculties were suited to discover or recognize reality; they 
rather ((constituted" reality, and were responsible for it. At a single 
stroke, Kant undermined the skepticism that had been threatening the 
Cartesian move toward usubjectivity." And he did it, not by denying 
subjectivity, but by pushing it further. Descartes has insisted on the 
autonomy of the individual in ascertaining the truth, but "the truth" 
remained something outside of him/her. Kant rejects the idea of this 
knowable uoutside,, something. Truth is a function of human 
experience. 
In undermining the old skepticism, however, Kant opened the way 
for a new skepticism, which, in the eyes of the Eighteenth Century 
Enlightenment, would be even more absurd. If we supply the struc, 
tures of the world, might not we supply different structures? Could 
different individuals or societies uconstitute" the world in different 
ways? What sense could be made of the commonsensical claim that 
the world exists independently of human experience, the same for us 
all. By the turn of the century, these questions would have to be taken 
seriously. But Kant had gone far enough. To prevent this new skepti­
cism, he developed the central argument of his first Critique. It was 
called a "transcendental deduction," and its purpose was to reestab­
lish the common sense view that there could be but one Reality, that 
it was inconceivable that different individuals, or different societies, 
could understand this woirld differently. Its procedure was to lay bare 
the set of concepts (or "categories") and principles through which we 
"constitute" and understand our world and then to prove that these 
were the only concepts through which we could do so. These con­
cepts and principles would be shown to hold a priori, universally an.cl 
necessarily for all knowing creatures. The result, therefore, would be a 
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single Reality, even if ··constituted" by us, with no possible alcerna­
tives. Any employment of these categories other than their proper 
application to the data of experience, Kant argued, resulted in hope­
less paradox. The new skeptic was temporarily silenced by Kant's 
transcendental attempt to prove that the categories through which 
he viewed his world were the only possible categories. 
Questions of knowledge were but one aspect of Kant's philosophi­
cal enterprise; he was equally concerned (and personally more so) 
with the unavoidable questions of traditional metaphysics concerning 
the nature of human freedom, the existence of God and the immortal­
ity of the human soul. These could not, by virtue of his own argu .. 
ments, be subject matter of (human) knowledge. And so Kant sup­
plemented his Transcendental Deduction with a conception of the 
world as it is uin itself," a concept which, whatever the objections 
raised by his critics, allowed him to reintroduce his concern with 
"God, Freedom and Immortality" on the firm ground of Reason. 
Reason had to be moved to the practical sphere and excluded from 
"knowledge" as such; but it was Reason just the same, the old privi­
leged contact with er the way the world is." even u in itself." 
Although the introduction of this conception of the world "in 
itself'' gave the perennial skeptic a new dichotomy in which to place 
his epistemological wedge, that was a philosophical price that Kant 
was willing to accept in order to avoid a consequence he feared far 
more. The idea that Reality might differ from our knowledge of it -
the basis for the old skepticism - frightened him not nearly so much 
as the idea that men might irresolvably disagree among themselves, 
not just about abstruse problems in metaphysics but about Euclidean 
geometry and Newtonian physics, belief in God and respect for the 
Moral Law. By separating knowledge from the world "in itself.'' Kant 
thought that at least he could establish the universality and necessity 
of a single set of epistemic principles of understanding and then could 
separately defend morality and Christianity with the same sense of 
confidence. The idea of alternative world views he found manifestly 
absurd; the· idea of a new form of philosophical skepticism was merely 
troublesome. It was far better to tolerate an abstract skepticism than 
concrete philosophical anarchy. 
In the last decade of that century, however, anarchy was as immi­
nent in philosophy as it was in politics. The old absolutes were disin­
tegrating under the Englightenment attacks in which Kant was so cen­
tral. The new heresies found themselves fighting among themselves 
for the power that soon would be theirs exclusively. And with the 
fighting, tensions emerged as contradictions, the taken-for-granted 
appeals to old traditions fell away and "common sense" was no longer 
common. Kant and Robespierre, with their common confidence in 
the Absolute (and their common admiration for the iconoclast Rous­
seau) attempted to hold their respective worlds together against their 
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own radical undermining. Both were doomed to fail. As Paris gave 
way to Robespierre's Terror and then Napoleon. the German philo­
sophical world began to appreciate the radical relativism that was 
implicit in Kant's revolution. 
The Triumph of Subjectivity 
Kant's brilliant if obscure "Transcendental Deduction" is a turning 
point within an epistemological tradition that all but defines European 
philosophy since Descartes. Basic to this tradition is a philosophical 
method or discipline which l have called "methodological solipsism. "'7 
(I borrow the term from Jonathan Bennett.) Methodological solipsism 
(MS) is what defined Descartes' "method of doubt," and it was 
adopted, in one form or another, by the British Empiricists, Kant, 
Fichte, Hegel, and nearly all contemporary philosophers who claim to 
follow "the phenomenlogical method," which is a tedious version of 
MS. One might characterize MS quite simply as a first-person philo­
sophical orientation which restricts the kinds of questions one can ask 
and the type of appeals one can make. In MS, every philosophical 
problem must be construed as my peculiar problem; the question 
uwhat is knowledge?," must, for example, be recast as "What is it for 
me .to know something?" I must determine what is justifiable for me 
to believe according to evidence which l have and rules of infe!"ence 
which I accept. Needless to say, there can be no appeal to authority, 
no appeal to other persons or "common sense." 
Now it is obvious how easily MS is threatened by skepticism and 
relativism; beginning from this "subjective" orientation, it is all too 
likely that we shall not get beyond ourselves, our own evidence and 
rules, that we might accumulate different evidence, or interpret it dif­
ferently, or adopt different rules of procedure and inference. MS is 
the mother of the "egocentric predicament.'' But solipsism is not the 
end of MS, only its opening posture. The aim of every MS-ist, from 
Descartes to Husserl, is to prove the objective validity of these subjec­
tive claims. In Descartes, this proof involved a well-known set of dub­
ious appeals to the beneficence of God; in Kant, the proof consists of 
"transcendental arguments" which demonstrate the necessity and uni­
versality of the principles of the understanding; for Hegel, the proof 
involves a convoluted "dialectic" of subjective concerns until an 
inter-subjective position emerges; for Husserl. the proof is an appeal 
to "essences" in experience whose meanings define objects of our 
experience and guarantee their objectivity at the same time. The main­
stream of European philosophy since Descartes, in other words, has 
been the struggle of MS to guarantee the objective validity of our 
claims. "The Absolute" was but one pretentious name for success in 
this enterprise. Relativism, on the other hand, was the booby prize -
8
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the position that resulted from failure to guarantee objective validtt\· 
for any single position. Accordingly, the Absolute represented the 
power of philosophy; relativism represemed philosoph1cal impotence . 
Kant's great anti,skeptical move in the .. Deduction" was the rejt:c­
tion of the empiricist model of knowledge as passive-r�cepti\·e 
"representation." In its place, Kant supp �ied the revolutionary notion 
of a priori synthesis, the idea that objects are not simply given in expe­
rience but rather constituted or synthesized as a necessary condition 
for expttience by the pure concepts of the understanding. But even as 
he argued for the active and constitutive role of Understanding and 
Imagination in perception, he retained the conservative belief that 
there is but one set of categories and one possible conception of rhe 
world. The move from the idea that we supply the categories by 
which objects are "constituted" to the idea that we might supply 
other categories repulsed him. Kant spoke ambiguously of these cate, 
gories as rules and structures of the human understanding. Since they 
were allegedly both universal and necessary, however, the difference 
between "rules" and "structures" was not significant. But the idea 
that these "necessary" principles of understanding were not indeed 
necessary did not bypass Gottlob Fichte, who took the germinal ideal 
of Kant's philosophy to be freedom, freedom from determination and 
freedom to apply the rules (not structures) of the understanding 
according to our needs.8 Fichte eliminated the retrogressive notion of 
the world "in itself' and restricted his attention to the development 
of a metaphysics of subjectivity. Questions of knowledge were rele, 
gated to secondary importance; he stressed above all that the Kantian 
uconstitution" of the world was a practical concern, an activity whose 
purpose was to provide us with a moral stage upon which to enact our 
hopefully heroic roles. Fichte gave us a choice of rules. The concept 
of universal and necessary principles gave way to a distinctive relati, 
vism: "the kind of philosophy that a man chooses depends upon the 
kind of man that he is . .. The choice Fichte offered us was in fact quite 
sparse , between the Newtonian and mechanistic categories of the first 
of Kant's Critiques (like most German intellectuals other than Kant, 
Fichte thought Newton "vulgar") and the moral principles of freedom 
0£ the second Critique, to which Fichte supplied a spectacularly 
romantic and heroic interpretation. Fichte retained the notion of "the 
Absolute," but it no longer referred to the objective validity of our 
beliefs and principles as such. "The Absolute" was rather the Ego that 
chose and adopted those beliefs and principles. Subjectivity had now 
become an end in itself. 
This extreme form of subjectivity, which virtually ignored the epis­
temological efforts of Kant's first Critique and left out questions of 
science and knowledge altogether, did not satisfy the many phil°' 
sophers who followed in Kant's footsteps. 9 Friedrich Schelling, a stu, 
dent of Fichte's and Hegel's younger friend, developed a usystem of 
9
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Transcendental Idealism'' in which the problems of science and 
knowledge were brought back into philosophy on an equal par with 
the problems of morality and religion. But Schelling, too, rejected 
Kant's notion of the world "in itself' apart from any possible human 
experience, and he also rejected the Kantian "Deduction" that proved 
that there was but a single set of categories of the Understanding. It 
was Schelling, several years before Hegel, who introduced the idea of 
a series of different categories, many of them competitive with and 
mutually exclusive of each other, each with its own "truth" but 
arranged in a dialectical "system" in which they could be compared 
and played against each other, reconciled and synthesized. Schelling, 
too, retained the notion of "the Absolute," but neither he nor Fichte 
used that term to signal a return to pre-Kantian metaphysics;10 uthe 
Absolute" referred to the unintelligibility of any attempt to distin­
guish objective validity from universal subjective constitution. There 
was no way of distinguishing those aspects of an object which we 
ufound" in it and those concepts through which we "posited" it. 
Schelling, like Fichte, expressed this important and contemporarily 
acceptable phUosophical principle in a horrendously misleading way 
so far as modern philosophers are concerned. Both insisted that uthe 
subject is identical with the object" ("The Principle of Identity"). 
This way of putting things won them few Anglo-American adherents, 
who still find such statements patent nonsense. But the ideas behind 
such
. 
claims, always to be viewed in the context of the MS program, is 
that only relativism is absolutely true. This paradoxical conclusion 
follows quite naturally from the history of the MS program from 
Descartes to Kant. Once it has been demonstrated that no uT ranscen­
dental Deduction" could prove the exclusive validity of any given set 
of beliefs or principles, the MS program could be saved only by 
acknowledging the fact that relativism was unavoidable, even desira­
ble, and itself made into an absolute truth. It is subjectivity itself that 
is absolute. 
Hegel's Absolute Relativism 
w·orking a quarter century after the publication of Kant's revolution­
ary Critique, whose ideas were now as established as the slogans of the 
great political revolution in France, G. W. F. Hegel, without Kant's 
timidity and with new-found transcendental Arroganz, pursued to the 
limits Kant's ideas of a priori synthesis and his rejection of the idea 
that objects are simply given in experience. From Fichte, he borrowed 
the now transformed notion of" the Absolute", the rejection of the 
world "in itself' and the idea of alternative categories, which he called 
uforms of consciousness." (This allowed him to include epistemic 
categories and "conceptual frameworks" as well as practical principles 
and "lifestyles" without making the sharp Kantian contrast between 
10
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them.) From Schelling, he borrowed (Schelling woul<l lat(!r av, 
"stole") the idea of a dialectic of forms of con c 1ousncss , arrangeJ in 
order of increased acceptability according to principle wh1Ch w�re 
.. internal" to those forms themselves. According to Hegel, every 
"form of consciousness" had its truth; but some forms were more 
adequate, more complete (more "true" if you like) than others. Here 
was the ideal compromise between Kant's dogmatic "Deduction'' and 
Fichte's free-wheeling "ethical idealism"; there are various forms of 
consciousness, all of which can be accepted and lived wnhout further 
progression of the dialectic. But this is not to say that there is nothing 
more to be said about them. "It is all relative"; yes. Bue relative to 
standards within the various forms themselves which can also be used 
to evaluate them. 
As in any discussion of Hegel's philosophy, it is necessary for us to 
remind ourselves that his notion of "the Absolute" is a multi-purpose 
conception. In addition to its epistemological-metaphysical signifi­
cance, it is also a quasi-religious conception, used with the traditional 
connotations of "God as Absolute" but in the very modern and heret­
ical sense of "God as Spirit," immanent in humanity and defensible 
only in terms of the Kantian Enlightenment criteria for a "natural" or 
tlrational" religion. Moreover, tithe Absolute" served an extremely 
important ideological purpose, the defense of political international­
ism that was still a romantic dream for the underdeveloped and dis­
united German states and principalities in the wake of Napoleon's vic­
tories. Hegel's personal concerns, at least at the writing of his Die 
Phanomenologie des Geistes11 were far more aimed at overcoming prob­
lems of German provincialism and traditional Christianity than in 
resolving certain post-Kantian problems in metaphysics and episte­
mology. But of the several birds Hegel beaned with the same philoso­
phical stone, we are here abstracting but a single one. In this sense, 
1•the Absolute" can be narrowly viewed as a position concerning 
alternative "forms of consciousness"; that position is that human 
experience is always relative to a form of consciousness, that forms of 
consciousness vary considerably and may in fact be competitive and 
mutually exclusive, but that it does not follow that there are no ways 
of comparing, contrasting, reconciling and synthesiziing ( "aufheben") 
them. Moreover, any form which is not an actual form of our exper­
ience (not just an abstract possibility) has no reason to be considered. 
The key to Hegel's "Absolute," following Schelling, is the "identity 
of the subject and the object." But once again, the meaning of this can 
be made out quite clearly and sensibly as the claim that there is no 
ultimate distinction that can be made out between those seemingly 
universal features of our experience that are "given" to us and those 
that we impose upon our experience through our forms of conscious­
ness. This is not to say, of course, that we can never make out this 
distinction; on the contrary, we often do, not only in details but with 
11
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regard ro rhe forms of consciousness rhemse-lve-s. From our disagree­
ments with other people (or other cinli:attons) we can - unless we 
are very stubborn - recogm:e ar least some of the differences 
between "the facts'' upon which we agree and the forms or interpreta­
tions about which we disagree. And from the very possibility of rec­
ogni:ing an alternative form of consciousness (for example. recogni:­
ing a society which adopts an animistic rather than a mechanistic view 
of physics). we can see the differences in alternatively imposed forms 
of consciousness and reflect upon the fact that various claims are in 
turn relative to a form of consciousness rather than simply being 
"known" through experience. Bur where there is a universal agree­
ment. there may be no way of knowing whether that agr1eement is 
indeed lfnecessary" in the sense that Kant defends - or whether it is 
simply agreement. 
As for the question of "conceivable alternatives" (a Kantian ques­
tion) that may point only to our own lack of imagination, nothing 
more. (Hegel was sufficiently humble on this point, in return for 
which he has been incessantly abused for thinking that he had "ended 
history.") In Hegel's "Absolute" there need be no transcendental pre­
tense, no need to ever assume that we have reached a source of 
genuine necessity rather than general agreement upon a "necessity'' 
relative to all of the particular forms of consciousness with which we 
are acquainted .. It is this abstinence that constitutes Hegel's "Abso­
lute" - the recognition of alternative forms of consciousness coupled 
with the humility (not evident in his terminology) that we can never 
know whether we have in fact found "necessary" structures of the 
human mind. In fact, the upshot of Hegel's thesis is that, because 
these questions are beyond the hope of meaningful confirmation, they 
are ultimately meaningless as well. (Contrary to his usual image as a 
wild-eyed "speculative metaphysician" who ignored all that Kant had 
argued regarding the possibility of trans-experiential knowledge, Hegel 
is a more thorough-going positivist, at least in this one sense, than 
Kant himself.) 
The concepts of "objectivity,, and "subjectivity" ("object" and 
"subject") that are at stake here are essential. In the older metaphysi­
cal tradition, the former signified "inherent in the object" and inde­
pendent of consciousness; the latter referred to "in consciousness. 11 
With Kant, however, the traditional distinction became meaningless, 
and the purpose of the Transcendental Deduction was rather to prove 
that objective principles (maxims, beliefs) were objective (Laws) in 
the sense that what was personally held was in fact necessary for 
anyone to hold. But in Hegel (as in Fichte and Schelling), this strong 
notion of "necessity" drops out as well, for Hthe Absolute" assured 
us that there is no ultimate necessity, but only, at best, all­
encompassing agreement. And so it is this notion of "agreement" th.at 
becomes the criterion for objectivity; a claim is objective (or objec-
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rively valid) in so far as 1t has proven to be intersuh1ect1vc. Ot ourse. 
there are re-
straints that must be placed upon this mt�rpretanon. It 1 not enough. 
for example, that a small and closed group hould believe a el\·en 
claim co make it " objective." "Common sense" 1s not ob1ect1\·eh· 
valid just because 1t 1s common. We should have to add that the crite­
ria for mutual acceptance must be imper onal. available co anyone and 
everyone with no a pnori privileged authorities. The group which 
defines "intersubject1vity" thereby becomes indefinitely extended. In 
other words, a claim is objective when it is acceptab le to any number 
of people who consider it 1mpersonally, relative to a given form of 
consciousness. Otherwise, it is merely subjective, a claim which has 
only personal support. But this interpretation still faces a problem -
the old nemesis of relativism - the possibility that two different 
forms of consciousness, each with its impersonal criteria and its open­
ended group of supporters, are competitive and murually exclusive. 
This would mean that, within two alternative forms of consciousness, 
one and "the same"12 claim would be objectively valid (and therefore 
"true") in one and not in the other. 
For example, a Newtonian would account for a given phenomenon 
in terms of causality and attraction, while a Leibnizian would explain 
"the same" phenomenon in terms which made no reference whatever 
to causality and attraction. More concretely, I may say of my desk 
that ,.it is solid oak," while my physicist friend assures me that it con­
sists of tiny "particles" of negligible weight spinning in mostly empty 
space. Both of our views are "objectively valid" ('•true") even though 
it is not possible for an object to be both solid and mostly empty 
space at one and the same time and in the same sense. The tentative 
rPply is that these forms of cognitive consciousness, though mutually 
exclusive on their face, are reconcilable in reflection, through the 
application of certain "bridge principles" connecting them and 
through the (reflective) understanding that they are in fact two forms 
of consciousness which do not, despite appearances, make incompati­
ble claims. The lesson to be learned from this familiar example is that 
the notion of competitive forms of consciousness, which make osten­
sibly contradictory claims, each of which is objectively valid, need not 
frighten us. We only require the confidence that eventually, through 
reflection, we shall be able to put each in its place and reconcile them. 
Thus the force of Hegel's .. Absolute." It includes no guarantee that 
such reconciliations will in fact always be available, much less a com, 
mitment to the Kantian pretense that som.e ultimate reconciliation is 
necessary by the very nature of human consciousness. We can easily 
find contemporary examples of such disagreements,, particularly at the 
fringes of science (e.g. in quantum theory and much of psychology), 
in which two very different forms of consciousness (ways of looking 
at the world, ways of looking at people) seem for the moment to be 
13
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utterly opposed and without promise of compromise. All we can do is 
hope and wo·rk for their ·reconciliation. {It is at this point that the 
indolence of vulgar relati\·ism becomes most apparent: "Oh well. 
they're just different ways of looking at things.") 
The preceding discussion should make easily accessible the often 
muddled notion of "dialectic" that is so important to Hegel's philo­
sophy. The "dialectic" is a means of reflection, of comparison and 
contrast, a technique which allows us always to examine two (or 
morel3) competing forms of consciousness from a third (or fourth, 
fifth, etc.) and see what they have in common and where they are 
askew, apparently making competitive claims which can ultimately be 
reconciled. And, of course, "dialectic" is always an attempt to appre­
ciate real disagreement as well. ( lt can be argued - as it was by Marx -
that Hegel placed too much emphasis on reconciliation without 
always appreciating the intractible force of the opposition.) From 
within a sing�e form of consciousness, another form may well seem 
irreconcilably opposed. For example, one religion may differ from 
another only in a minor appeal to authority, a mythological variation, 
or in the importance of a particular role or ritual. The unreflecting 
proponents of those religions will see themselves in eternal battle, and 
the history of religion (and politics) teaches all too well that such self­
enclosed forms of consciousness will often prefer mutual destruction 
to compromise. From our14 point of view, however, the differences 
may be obviously beside the point, given the purpose and the nature 
of religion. But this conception of "the purpose and the nature of 
religion" is only possible from our expanded point of view, not 
within theirs. Each of the antagonists will necessarily believe -
according to one criterion - that his or her religion is the "true" one; 
we can say, however, that each one "has its truth," but that neither is 
"true" as such. (It was this relativist view of religion, in particular, 
that motivated Hegel, foUowing Lessing, to develop his sense of 
11 dialectic.") 
The purpose of the dialectic is to force ourselves into a position in 
which we will see both the strong points and the weak points and fal­
lacies of a given form of consciousness (in its own terms, always!) 
and, in doing so, come to see and appreciate alternative forms of con­
sciousness that are ostensibly opposed. "Dialectic," simply stated, is 
the demand that we continuously attempt to force ourselves beyond 
our "form of consciousness," in order to appreciate its limitations 
and to thereby adopt a broader view. Hegel sometimes suggests that 
this drive for breadth is inherent in the human spirit, if not in every 
individual, something like a "Will to Truth" or a Spinozan "Cona­
tus." More often, however, he indicates that it is the inadequacy of a 
form of consciousness itself that drives us onward. It is the essence of 
"modern civilization" (and it certainly so seemed in 1806) to change 
and confront what is "foreign" to it, rendering old ways of thinking 
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obsolete and showing established viewpoints to be narrow-minded. 
This is, on the one hand, the intellectual imperialism of the transcen­
dental pretense; but it is also opening oneself up to the constant pos� 
sibility of refutation and ways of seeing that may even be superior tO 
our own. 1 'S  What characterized modern civilization. perhaps is just this 
tendency to seek out just such means of self-refutation. 10  Thus it is 
the antidote to the transcendental pretense as well. 
Hegel's " Absolute" is best viewed not as a position but as a hope, a 
heuristic principle that urges us to seek agreement where none seems 
possible, even at the cost of our old habits and concepts. Terminology 
aside, "the Absolute" is a lesson in humility, teaching us that our 
views of the world are never ultimate and that we can never escape 
our own relatively limited perspective. Hegel's "Absolute" is the final 
explosion of absolutism and the transcendental pretense, the ultimate 
rejection of the idea that it even makes sense to speak of a world "in 
itself' ' or a uniquely "true" form of experience. Thus J. N. Findlay 
calls Hegel's philosophy a "relative Absolutism,"17 relative to his own 
admittedly fragile place in an extremely uncertain historical epoch. 
But Hegel's " Absolute" is not just relative; rather his "Absolute" is 
itself relativism, or " Absolute relativism." The climax of Hegel's Phe­
nomenology, so conceived, is the ultimate in philosophical therapy, a La 
Nietzsche or Wittengstein, the reduction to absurdity of the whole 
history of the transcendental pretense, and ironically, in its own 
terms. 
A nagging objection remains. If this interpretation is even plausible, 
why in the world did Hegel use u Absolute" language? Why was he so 
adamant a.bout "science" and "truth," nabsolute truth,, at that, if he, 
in effect, was attacking those very conceptions as they had been tradi, 
tionally understood? Of course, he had a career, a tradition and the 
critics to contend with. And he had other reasons for making univer, 
salist mov,es - the political motivation behind his generalizing from 
individual self into universal Spirit and the quasi,religious motivation 
for identifying the Absolute with Spirit with God. "Absolute" ,type 
terms and ideas were dominant at the time, from Kant, Fichte and 
Schelling, and Hegel's original intention (pretension) in writing the 
Phanomenologie was clearly to "demonstrnte'- more adequately than 
his illustrious predecessors- the necessity of the Absolute. And yet, 
Hegel also credited Kant- in particular his arguments against the 
"Paralogisms of Rational Psychology"- with ending the dogma.tic 
reign of any ontological conception of the soul/ self as substance, and 
he agreed wholeheartedly with Fichte and Schelling that any ontologi, 
cal notion of the world as "in itself' was equally unsatisfactory. The 
Phanomenologie began as a demonstration of the Absolute but ended 
up the most forceful early statement of the possibility of- and the 
only partial commensurability of alternative conceptual frameworks, 
and though the dialectic promised a mode of conflict resolution 
15
Solomon: The Ego in Germanic Philosophy: A Reexamination
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1987
The Ego in Germanic Philosoph� 19 
between them, it was always clear that some conflict would remain. 
Bur having shown this. Hegel promptly denied it. By the rime he sat 
down to write his encore to the Phanomenologie. the Science of Logic 
and then the so-called "system." Hegel still felt the binding force of 
the philosopher's need for an Archimedean point from which to 
defend his position. and having so thoroughly declared the relativity 
of all forms of consciousness, he transcendentalized his relativism to 
adopt a meta version of the same transcendental pretense. 18 
Hegel's Hope and Hegel's Heritage 
Soon after Hegel, the " Absolute" was just a word, often used in deri­
sion; Relativism was on the horizon, with its very real differences 
between alternative "forms of consciousness," ways of thinking, styles 
of life. But Hegel's hope for ultimate agreement was not enough. He 
had suggested, though none too clearly, that our disagreements were, 
in some ultimate sense, far less important ( though not thereby 
" unreal" )  than our unity in the one all-embracing concept of "Spirit." 
B,ut this ultimate sense could hardly satisfy those who were disturbed 
by the turbulent differences of opinion that defined the mid­
Nineteenth Century. Ultimate or not, those disagreements demanded 
immediate attention, analysis, and resolution. 
As. in Fichte, epistemological and metaphysical relativism play a rel­
atively small role in Hegel's overall philosophy. Both philosophers 
had pointed to the practkal determinants of various '1ways of know­
ing" and so much of their analysis is concerned with the pragmatic 
conditions relative to which a form of consciousness existed. These 
"pragmatic" conditions varied from the psychological to the social to 
the «philosophical" (in the sense in which philosophy is a practical 
rationalization of a life style or course of action). Given his overall 
concern for basic concepts, Hegel inevitably stressed the role of ideas 
in his analysis of these conditions. His reward for this emphasis has 
been a century and a half of misunderstanding, first popularized by 
Kierkegaard and Marx, but still current today, according to which 
Hegel simply ignored such conditions and treated uideas" as if they 
had an ethereal life of their own. 
It was the conditions relative to which a form of consciousness 
existed that formed the basis of subsequent attempts to resolve the 
conflicts which currently made relativism a real fact of human exist­
ence as well as a powerful philosophical theory. It is important to 
note that epistemological and metaphysical relativism were rarely if 
ever argued in isolation from pragmatic and sociological theses. (One 
of the striking features of more current debates, particularly in Amer­
ica, is the almost total neglect of extra-cognitive determinants. When 
the importance of these is acknowledged, it is usually only with a 
passing reference, rarely with an analysis. In Nineteenth and Twen-
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tieth Century European philosophv. on the other hand. such featur�s 
usually receive dominant attention. )  Cognitive relati\·1sm. accorJm�h-. 
could be demonstrated to be a function of these other condinons. and 
the conflicts to be resolved, therefore. might be settled bv ap�al to 
these conditions, or by changing these conditions. but at least bv first 
recognizing them. But notice that these condinons. so descnhcd. seem 
to be a new candidate for "the Absolute." For Kierkegaard. psycho­
logical considerations became the new fulcrum of philosophy; for 
Karl Marx, economic conditions became the new Archimedian point . 
Among the prominent post,Hegelians, Soren Kierkegaard deserves 
primary attention, not so much because of his avowedly violent anti­
Hegelianism, but precisely because of his enormous debts to Hegel. 
His concept of the "spheres of existence" is roughly equivalent co 
Hegel's "forms of consciousness," supposedly eschewed of all cogni, 
tive commitment. ("I always say, 'All honor to the sciences, but . . . "' )19 
Superficially, Kierkegaard's differences with Hegel are widely known. 
Where Hegel stressed "Spirit" and intersubjectivity, Kierkegaard 
stresses "the individual." In fact, it would not be far-fetched to say 
that "the individual" becomes Kierkegaard's Absolute, except that, in 
the most obvious sense, this is just playing with words. The whole 
question of absolutism,relativism concerns precisely the possibility of 
a "truth" that is not necessarily true for everyone. To speak of the 
individual as "absolute," therefore, is to avoid the question alto, 
gether, and probably to descend into vulgar relativism as well. K ierke, 
gaard's notoriously polemical concept of "subjective truth" has just 
these effects. But for Kierkegaard as for Hegel, "objective truth" 
means "true for everyone," and the difference between them thus 
concerns only "styles of life," not 0 truth" as such ( that is, 0objective 
truth"). But even here, the differences are not what they seem. Kier, 
kegaard's three "spheres" (aesthetic, ethical and religious) are easily 
translated mto more complicated forms on the Hegelian dialectic: 
Kierkegaard loudly protests the Hegelian argument in favor of some 
of these forms over others, and he offers up his own "existential dia, 
lectic" in its place, in which no life style is logically preferable over 
any other.20 But the key here is "logically," for in fact, Kierkegaard 
introduces his own arguments, to the same end as Hegel, for the ulti, 
mate superiority of the religious or spiritual life. But instead of pro� 
viding a " logical" argument, Kierkegaard supplies a psychological 
argument, one whose acceptance depends upon certain psychological 
preconditions in the individual. Kierkegaard further assumes that 
people are basically the same (although he also insists that most peo, 
pie have only "so-called existence"21) and thus assumes that his psy­
chological arguments should, if paid heed to, work on everyone. 
( Most people, he complains, simply won't heed.) Thus the idea that 
the individual is absofote takes on a far more significant meaning, and 
one far closer to Hegel. Hegel may have given far less attention to the 
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universal psychological conditions he presupposed ( for example. the 
need to comprehend. the need for coherence and "harmony," the 
need for identity ) but they are always there. Kierkegaard may give far 
more attention to the workings of these motives in "the individual. . .  
but this does not in the least imply that these motives are not also 
universal. and that the psychological arguments he pro,·ides ( by way 
of "seduction " )  might not serve absolutist ends as well. Finally. when 
we turn to the development of these themes. particularly in Kierke­
gaard's later writing, the undisguised authoritarianism of his defense 
of Christianit)'  offers substtantial evidence for the claim that. despite 
his strong disclaimers in the name of individuality and freedom. he is 
ev,en more of an absolutist than Hegel. Hegel's absolutism. at least, is 
an. ultimately pluralist relativism with the hope of some ultimate 
agreement; Kierkegaard, on the other hand, advances a very specific 
Absolute, Christianity, and though one must "choose" it he leaves no 
doubt but that one ought (psychologically) to do just that. Where 
Hegel left this psychology in very general terms - though still debat­
able - Kierkegaard ties it down to a very specific set of authoritarian 
needs suppliable only by Christianity. 
Karl Marx identified the conditions relative to which a form of con­
sciousness existed as the economic conditions governing material pro­
duction and labor. Following Hegel with an economist's eye, Marx 
added to HegePs dialectic of forms the "presuppositions" of human 
survival - economics. zz Compared with each other, the various forms 
of the dialectic might seem "relative"; but relative to what? This called 
for a scientific explanation, viewing the "forms of consciousness" as 
the products of the material conditions in which people live. Changes 
(" progress") in the dialectic were not a matter merely of inadequacies 
and contradictions in the forms themselves, but rather a matter of 
rationalizing changing economic circumstances and interests. But then 
the contradictions could be resolved as well by changing these eco­
nomic conditions, in particular, by eliminating the economic class of 
differences which required the conflicting rationalization. captured in 
Hegel's dialectic. 
Epistemologically, Marx's concept of "science" had clearly absolu­
tist pretentions; and economics, in effect, became the new absolute. 
Like Hegel, Marx required a uscientific11 standpoint from which to 
judge the various alternatives, and his relativism did not extend to his 
own viewpoint. But it is important that economics, as well as the 
scientific method, formed the absolute basis of his theories; all the 
rest was mere ccsuper,structure. ,, This is the emphasis of virtually all 
of the relativistic philosophers of the Nineteenth Century: epistemo­
logical and metaphysical relativism is often accepted only as the corol­
lary to a psychological, sociological or cultural thesis, which itself may 
not be relativistic at all. Kierkegaard may be a relativist with regard to 
marriage, but he is an absolutist when it comes to religion. Marx may 
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be a relativist with regard to Hegel's forms, but he is an absolutist 
when it comes to human dignity and the right to the fruits of one's 
labor. Thus the questions of cognitive relativism dovetail into more 
general questions about the " sociology of knowledge" and ''cultural 
relativism" as well as the supposed universality of " human nature." If 
epistemological and metaphysical beliefs have these other questions as 
their implicit foundation ( rather than the other way around, as i.n the 
past many centuries of Western thinking), then relativism must be 
examined on a far broader stage (anticipated by Fichte and Hegel ). 
and the questions are no longer the domain of philosophy alone. 
The Limits of Objectivity: Nietzsche and Dilthey 
Friedrich Nietzsche is not usually seen in the tradition of Kant, Fichte, 
and Hegel23 mainly because he has been so long and so narrowly 
depicted as merely a moralist and an "antichrist." It is true that he 
was driven by his antagonism to both moral and religious absolutism 
but included in this antagonism was the rejection of absolutism in all 
forms. Needless to say, the idea that relativism might damage the sta­
tus of religion did not disturb Nietzsche in the slightest. His . .  perspec­
tivism," so called, entailed that every form of know�edge, belief and 
value is to be considered but one among many viewpoints, including 
Christianity and what we typically call It Morality ." Perspectivism, 
accordingly, would be defended as a position of integrity; all forms of 
absolutism would be a sign of cowardice, dogmatism, an intellectual 
as well as a cultural disease. 
The traditional technique of philosophers and moralists had been 
to build a set of moral principles upon a relatively secure view of real, 
ity. Once we know about the world and about ourselves, they would 
say, we can figure out what we ought to do. c·Before deciding what is 
wrong and what is right/first we must find out what we are." Peter 
Weiss, Marat/Sade). This tradition had been seriously challenged by 
Fichte and Hegel. Nietzsche completely reverses the process: all meta, 
physical and philosophical views, he tells us, are rationalizations of 
moral prejudices.24 This is true not only of the content of a metaphys, 
ical or philosophical theory, but of its form as well. In particular, the 
absolutist C' universal" or "a priori" )  form of such a. view is itself the 
symptom of a fatal weakness, the fear of being wrong. It is the mark 
of the insecure attitude which can accept nothing without making cer, 
tain that everyone else must accept it as well. 
Nietzsche's tendency ( not uncommon in German philosophy) to 
look at himself as an isolated innovator and iconoclast should not 
blind us to the fact that the themes he pursues had already been set up 
for him by his turn-of,the,century predecessors. Even his attack on 
Christianity and morality, in which Kant so often serves as the butt of 
his sarcasm, is made possible by Kant's "revolution.,' Nietzsche's epis, 
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temological nihilism. as it is often called. is the unyielding pursuit of 
those basic themes in modern philosophy since Descartes: the almost 
fanatical stress on autonomy and methodological solipsism. the ref­
usal to rest with common sense and the demand that we take skepti .. 
cism seriously; continuing refusal to retreat to the "other-wordly." 
whether Chris1Cian Heaven or Platonic " forms"; Cartesian confidence 
in God or the slim conception of the "world-in-itself" that remains in 
Kant's first Cririque. Following Fichte and Hegel (but without giving 
chem credit), Nieusche incisively lambastes and lampoons (the argu­
ments are too thin to allow us to say "refutes") the idea of ''the real 
world"; "the apparent world is the only one, the 'real world' is merely 
added to a lie. "25 Anticipating the radical pragmatic theses of Quine, 
Nierzsche argued against his contemporaries (as Quine later argues 
against Carnap); 11 against positivism, which halts at phenomena -
'there are only facts'- I would say, No, Facts is precisely what there 
is not, only interpretations. "26 And with this emphasis upon interpre­
tation - personal interpretation, we must add - the concepts of "the 
truth," "the Absolute Truth," "the Absolute," vanish before us; 
"what is needed is that something must be held to be true, not that 
something is true. "27 The thesis itself comes directly from Kant 
through Fichte and Hegel; there can be no unconceptualized experien­
ces; every conceptualization is already the imposition of an interpreta­
tion. On Nietzsche's radical individualization of this thesis, it follows 
that every individual has his own '' truths" - his own interpretations. 
"There is no truth. "28 No world view is any more 11true" than any 
other; comparisons are to be made from the point of view of mental 
health rather than epistemology and metaphysics. In Wittgensteinian 
terms, truth becomes the function of a form of life. 
In defense of his pragmatic relativism, Nietzsche takes a step over­
board, as he often does, and moves from the thesis that "there is no 
truth," no world-in-itself and no " Absolute" knowledge which we 
must all share, to the outlandishly paradoxical thesis that "truth is 
error.•129 In response to Kant's "transcendental" pretensions, 
Nietzsche sugg:ests that there are merely certain schemes of interpreta­
tion which ccwe cannot throw off"; but this shows only a limitation 
on our part, not a conceptual boundary. ccwhat are mankind's truths? 
They are the irrefutable errors of mankind. "30 "Truth is that sort of 
error without which a particular class of living creatures could not 
live. "31 But there is no need for him to confuse matters by couching 
this Darwinian theory of knowledge in traditional metaphysical lan­
guage; it is her1e that Nietzsche betrays his own residual absolutism, as 
if there were still some standard according to which our conveniences 
could still be "false." 
According to Nietzsche, "necessary truths" seem necessary only 
because, by virtue of the contingencies of evolution, we all happen to 
believe them and, perhaps, such beliefs themselves have been instru-
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�ntal in our survival. But there is nothing more to be said. There 
need be no more �arching for and idealization of "the Truth." The 
point is to live, to believe only what will "enhance life" and not to 
believe what ''degrades life" , no matter how metaphysically appealing. 
And so he turns to Morality and Christianity, diagnosing them as a 
physician would a disease of the body, as symptoms of weaknes.s and 
lack of integrity and courage. He rejects the Kantian question, "How 
are a priori (necessary) truths possible? and asks instead, "Why 
should we thinJc such truths are necessary in the first place?" 
In opposition to traditional metaphysics and epistemology, 
Nietzsche insists upon the necessity of keeping alive· a number of 
"perspectives,. or viewpoints; against the "Will to Truth '', Nietzsche 
urges a bold experimentalism, "to look now out of this window, now 
out of th.at", guarding against "settling down with any dogma. "32 
There is no "true" viewpoint, only that which prevails. Nietzsche's 
philosophy, as everyone knows, ultimately turns to a "Will to 
Power." But without pursuing this much abused notion, we can 
appreciate its relativistic import; if there is no truth, and no utrue" 
practical imperatives either, then conceptual frameworks must be 
viewed in open competition, not for truth but for pragmatic value and 
acceptance. In phil0&0phy as in football (according to a local Texas 
sage) "winning is everything."33 But even this is not an absolute for 
Nietzsche: he ominously warns (in Zarathustra and elsewhere) that the 
"higher men" do not always win, and probably will not in the struggle 
ahead. 
Wilhelm Dilthey ( 1833-191 1 )  never acquired the reputation of 
"arch-destroyer" that has always haunted Nietzsche. His style was 
staid and academic, respectively obscure and unambitious. (Nothing 
like Nietische's "I am dynamite!" or 0My Zarathustra is more impor­
tant than Christ.") As an academic, Dilthey's Kantian-Hegelian influ­
ences are obvious; he called one of his works a "Critique of Historical 
Reason"; and it is worth noting that, for twenty years ( 1 882-190 1 ), 
he held Hegel's chair in philosophy in Berlin. His "epistemological 
standpoint" was explicitly borrowed from Kant, and his emphasis 
upon "Spirit" (or "Geist") and its various historical manifestations in 
different world-views (or weltanschauunggen - a term he made famous 
but did not originate) is taken more or [ess directly from Hegel. Dil .. 
they established, but did not invent, that philosophical doctrine 
known as "historicism". It is, we may anticipate, Nietzsche's "pers­
pectivism" carried across the dimension of Time.34 
From Kant, Dilthey inherited the once "revolutionary" view that all 
human experience was constituted by the active imposition of catego­
ries (for Dilthey, categories of life, not just understanding). But he 
rejected the transcendental pretention that sought to find the struc­
tures of the human mind, the goals of human activity and the basic 
forms of human knowledge. From Hegel (about whom he once wrote 
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a massive study). Dilthey adopted the model of process and move­
ment as the answer to the static Absolutism of the still lively neo­
Kantian transcendentalism that flourished in Germany ( see the follow­
ing section, for example). From Hegel too came the great variety of 
forms of consciousness, scattered across the globe and, more impor­
tantly, across history, and the intrinsically human desire (which 
inspired Kant as well as Hegel ) to formulate some total comprehen­
sion of this vast human panorama. But, in Dilthey's historicism. such 
comprehension was only the ideal, never a real possibility. He denied 
from the outset the idea that there might be any absolute source of 
human knowledge, any absolute or absolutely valid metaphysics or 
religion, any exclusive starting point for any kind of inquiry or activ­
ity, and "foundations" of knowledge of guaranteed principles of prac­
tical reason. Nor are there even any abstract terms which might be 
used for cross categorization and understanding; as Hegel had indi­
cated, though often confusedly in his "dialectic", concepts are con­
textbound and have meanings only within the specific historical­
conceptual context within which we are situated. And in terms of our 
philosophy, these theses have radical consequences. It means that the 
most we can do, with regard to any historical epoch or society , is to 
make the attempt to enter into their points of view, to adopt the total­
ity of their outlook, for it is never enough to single out isolated and 
possibly only superficial or nominal differences between them and 
ourselves. (It is worth insisting that the concept of "Verstehen", liter­
ally "understanding" but usually translated as "empathy", is not 
simply "putting oneself in the other's place" in the usual, emotional 
sense. Dilthey was, even more than Hegel, interested in history as a 
science.35 But this means for him that we must always recognize the 
limitations of our own conceptions, our own age and prejudices, 
which we can never overcome. Here again is the relativist's untranslat­
ability thesis -that we can never really know whether we have undeir­
stood another society or conceptual framework or not. This isn't to 
say that we can't understand or approximate, but always with a hum­
ble sense of limitations. Consequently, we can never claim confidence 
in any general laws of human nature which maintain themselves as 
Absolute. 
Relativism is the key to Dilthey's philosophy. He saw himself reviv­
ing German idealism in the face of overwhelming positivism and 
emphasis upon the physical sciences (and human sciences subjected to 
inappropriately physicalistic paradigms.)  In this he acted in concert 
with Nietzsche, his non-academic contemporary, emphasizing a "Phi­
losophy of Life" and holistic humanism against the threats of "Abso­
lu tism" emanating from both aggressive science and defensive reli­
gion. Dilthey's relativism - or rather historicism - is not as 
pronounced as Nietzsche's, partly because Dilthey, unlike Nietzsche, 
strove explicitly and continuously for an "all embracing philosophy", 
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an enterprise Nietzsche considered intellectually suspect and which 
presents the superficial appearance ( but only the superficial appear­
ance) of Absolutism rather than relativism. He attacks Hegel's nomi,. 
nal Absolutism, insisting instead that there are no upper limits to 
human development, no Absolute but only, to use Nietzsche's phrase 
that fits so well, continuous " self-overc oming" ( mainly through phi­
losophy). ( Hegel would agree. )  
In fact, Nietzsche also had an acute sense o f  history. ( It was virtu­
ally impossible for a Nineteenth Century German philosopher not 
to.) But surely the stress on history is far stronger in Dilthey than in 
Nietzsche. More importantly, however, the two are divided by the 
extreme individualism that Nietzsche imposed upon his relativism. He 
was very much more than a merely methodological solipsist, while 
Dilthey followed Hegel closely in his insistence that the "categories of 
life" were mutually formulated in the context of society. Nietzsche's 
views of "society", of course, were mostly damning; "the herd" he 
called it. He even went so far as to condemn language and conscious­
ness as embodiments of everything that was common between us, 
thus damaging to what made each of us unique. And ultimately, 
because of this attack, Nietzsche's own ideals of '• self-overcoming" 
and his "ubermensch" became, in Dilthey's words, a mere "abstract 
scheme of man, his abstract empty ideal:36 
Nietzsche stands as a warning of where the brooding 
individual mind leads, which tries to grasp the 
essence of life within its own self. He denounced his­
tory, perhaps in disgust at its unlimited critical detail, 
without which it is not truly a science. He believed 
that he had to disregard everything that this history 
and the community had done to him; he peeled off 
skins one after another. The core, the problem of 
what constitutes man, he thought he could then seize 
in an ever new anguish of brooding about himself ... 37 
Perhaps the criticism is not wholly warranted; but it points out the 
extent of Dilthey's relativism - which was so radical that he could 
accuse even Nietzsche of falling back to an "Absolute" concept of 
man (which he sought to find in himself). Dilthey, as emphatically as 
any philosopher of his time, attacked "the Absolute" and all forms of 
the ((transcendental pretense" without a pause. His categories of life 
were empirical generalizations drawn from his particular set of pers­
pectives; there was nothing "necessary" or '•a priori" about them. 
And when such generalizations were "objectified" ( universalized) as 
they almost always were, that made them no less relative. Against the 
empiricists and positivists of his day, he (like Nietzsche) attacked any 
conception of "the facts" - even including the conception of "sense 
data" and the like, which might provide some basis for a new claim to 
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Absolute knowledge. however minimal. All knowledge. he insists, is 
strictly subjective, subject, that is. to limitations of our perspective 
and our sense of history. The ideal. accordingly. is to expand our 
hori�oru (another term made famous by Dilthey 1 which will play an 
important part in the phenomenology of his most eminent critic, 
Edmund Husserl ). Philosophy is the continuous and endless striving 
to broaden our scope. to "put ourselves in the place of" as many dif­
ferent peoples and epochs as we can. and to develop as comprehensive 
an interpretation of history as we can at any particular time. Here is 
Hegel's nominal " Absolute," indefinitely open-ended. And here is 
Nietzsche's "self-overcoming," not in the form of an individual 
"Ubermensch" but in terms of a historical project in which we must 
all take our part. For Dilthey, as for Nietzsche, the death of the Abso­
lute was a cause for cheerfulness and celebration. In place of indispu­
table deals, we now had seemingly unlimited possibilities. Here is the 
relativist's best answer to the cynicism of the disappointed Absolutist. 
And here was Dilthey's answer to the "crisis in Science and European 
Civilization" which was to give metaphysics and epistemology at the 
turn of this Century such a desparate pragmatic aura. 
The Transcendental Reactionl8 
Husserl is usually treated as one of the first great philosophers of the 
twentieth century; I think he is far better understood as one of the last 
hold-outs of the 19th. It is against the background of Kant, Fichte, 
Hegel, Nietzsche and Dilthey, that we can best understand Edmund 
Husserl's much-celebrated "phenomenology." His "phenomenologi­
cal method", an up-dated version of methodological soipsism, was 
derived in essence from Descartes (one of the few historical debts 
acknowledged by Husserl) and constituted nothing other than a con­
tinuation of the main epistemological methodology of no less than a 
half-dozen generations of German philosophers.His rejection of the 
cultural and pragmatic determinants of knowledge was something of a 
regression. His feted "return to subjectivity" was virtually the oldest 
"return" in modern European philosophy. What characterized Hus­
serl's self-proclaimed "revolution" was, as he admitted himself,39 a 
conservative reaction, an attempt to stop the almost completed drift 
of European philosophy toward relativism. The loss of absolutes he 
considered a genuine "crisi!s,'' not only in the sciences but in "Euro­
pean civilization" as well. (This notion of "the Crisis of European 
Man" was in fact taken from Dilthey, Husserl's nemesis.) His "phe­
nomenology '' was a program to restore to philosophy its scientific sta­
tus - that is, Absolute status, and to return European thought to the 
road of Rationality, that is, the True Road. It was a return to the 
1' Absolute'' Cartesian starting point, - the "self-evident11 of one's 
own self-consciousness. This program was presented in an ill-
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organized and continuously propadeutic re,focussmg on the notion of 
a philosophical "science" and the need for rigor and a return to sub, 
jectivity. But the aim of Husserl's philosophy. from his early Logical 
lnvescigations to his last works, was to go beyond the subjectively vari, 
able "facts" of experience and the relativity of theories and customs 
to essences or ideas, which are, as he tells us in one of his first pro, 
grammatic essays, "absolutely given in immediate intuition." Phe, 
nomenology is an appeal to the evidence, not the factual evidence of 
experience but the apodictic evidence of necessity. The phenomeno, 
logical program is a reaction to historicism, perspectivism, and relati, 
vism. Much of Husserl's perpetual restarting and his confusing obs, 
curity can be traced to the desperate and hopeless reactionism of his 
program - once it is clearly recognized as such. 
Husserl entered philosophy as a mathematician, interested in the 
foundations of arithmetic and the concept of ft necessary truth . " This 
is the turning point in all debates about Absolutism,relativism. ( Are 
"necessary truths" necessarily true? Or are they only believed to be 
such by a certain sort of creature, as N ietzsche argued?) His first major 
work was a defense of a psychologistic thesis, following the British 
philosopher John Stuart Mill and his teacher Karl Stumpf. in which 
he argued that the necessary truths and concepts of mathematics were 
merely psychological associations. i t  It is evident that this is precisely 
the thesis that lies behind the most extreme relativism, for once neces, 
sary truths are "merely" psychological, it follows that they might well 
(and probably will) vary from creature to creature, if not even from 
society to society. After a short but decisive dispute with the master 
logician, Gottlob Frege;42 Husserl abandoned this position, and spent 
the rest of his life trying to refute it. Relativism, in his opinion, was an 
"absurd" doctrine; psychologism, as its basis, must be equally 
"absurd." The business of philosophy, he insisted early on, was to 
find ff decisive cognitions," f f  absolute principles," apodictic evidence 
and invariable ft essences." Any philosopher that emerged embracing 
relativism must be viewed as its own refutation; after all, his familiar 
argument concludes, doesn't it thereby insist that it too is only rela; 
tive, not r·eally true at all? In 1900; 1901 , Husserl published his first 
and, by sympathetic accounts, his definitive refutation of psycholo­
gism. The first volume of his Logical lrwescigacions included an exhaus; 
tive attack upon the psychologistic doctrines he had once briefly 
defended. In the foreword to that work, he confesses to his being dis .. 
turbed " more and more by the fundamental doubt, - how the objec; 
tivity of mathematics, and of all science in general. , is consistent with 
logic having a psychological basis. "43 Although agreeing with Frege 
that psychology could not provide the ccfoundations" of mathematics 
or necessary truth (" science,,) in general, Husserl also rejected Frege's 
suggestion that such matters were normative conventions. For Hus; 
serl, the laws of mathematics and ccscience" had to be necessarily true, 
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ideal principles which could be known with absolute cerrainry. Any 
other view, in Husserl's opinion, resulted in the absurd conclusions of 
skepticism. 
Ir is important to appreciate the central role that the alleged 
"absurdity "  of skepticism played in Husserl's philosophy; it was the 
conclusion of a reduccio ad absurdum argument which defined his 
entire career. If seemingly necessary truths, e.g. the basic postulates of 
arithmetic, were in fact only psychological (and therefore empirical) 
generalizations, then they cannot be known with certainly ( for no 
empirical generalization can be known with ' 'certainty" in this very 
strong sense ); it cannot be assumed that the same necessary truths are 
in fact true for creatures or persons with a different psychologica[ 
make-up, and indeed these "necessary truths" might not be truths at 
aJl.H On the psychologistic account, there need be nothing other than 
tihe relevant psychological disposition, nothing to which it corres­
ponds and thus nothing to make it true. Using a tacit "correspon­
dence theory of truth "45 as his guide, Husserl sought entitites other 
than empirically ascertainable facts (e.g. the facts of psychology) to 
which these necessary truths would correspond, and thus be true 
( necessarily). Those peculiar entitites were essences or ideas; they 
were sharply distinguished from "facts"46 and known (or ccgrasped") 
by an entirely different form of cc intuition." These were those peculiar 
••third r:ealm" entities that Frege had described as meanings (Sinne), 
to be sharply distinguished from both psychological s·tates (or cc acts" 
and from the objects in the world to which they (usually) referred. 
Borrowing from Frege the crucial distinctions between meaning and 
reference, content and object, Husserl fashioned a formidable phe­
nomenological world47 of strange eternal entities. He was not the first 
philosopher of his time to do so48 but his ambitions far exceeded the 
others'. Using these meanings, essences and "evidence" as his con­
stant source of appeal, he revived the old absolutist claim; there was 
such a thing as The Truth; relativism was false. No matter how varied 
our perceptions of empirical matters, regarding essences our intuitions 
were certain. 
Then, of course, comes the obvious objection, the thorn in the side 
of all absolutists: "what if we disagree about our essential intuitions?" 
Even apart from the more sophisticated objections to Husserl's the­
ory, for example, objections to the tacit correspondence theory of 
truth, objections to the peculiar status of "essences" and objections to 
the strong claims of necessity that he invokes, this is a telling criti­
cism, and one which neither Husserl nor any of his followers ever 
succeeded in refuting. To the contrary, Husserl's own later work 
shows that he openly surrendered to this simple objection, for he 
explicitly moves away from individual intuition (and correspondence 
theory as well), and towards "intersubjectivity," that is, mutual 
agreement as the criterion (rather than the result) of objectivity. 
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Because Husserl virtually equated relativism and skepticism (or. at 
least, saw the latter as an unavoidable and intolerable consequenct! of 
the former), he waged a constant war on all forms of " historicism" 
and " perceptivism. "  In his early essay ( " Philosophy as a Rigorous 
Science" ) he blames Hegel and his "Romantic "C ? )  philosophy for "it� 
doctrine of the rdative justification of every philosophy for its own 
time."49 Husserl is not quite sure what to do with Hegel's claim for 
the ''absolute validity" ( ibid) of this same relativism; and so he moves 
quickly to Dilthey, with whom he had frequent and open correspon, 
dence and controversy; "As the result of the transformation of Heg, 
el's metaphysical philosophy of history into a skeptical historicism, 
the es,tablishment of the new Welcanschauung philosophy has now 
been essentially determined. "SC It is important to notice how easily 
Husserl moves from Dilthey's (and Hegel's) relativism to the notion 
of " historical skepticism," which he (and Hegel ) would surely reject 
out of hand. It is also important to notice how Husserl's confusion 
with Hegel anticipates a major argument of his overall philosophy; 
regarding all forms of relativism, "the question is whether it can be 
justified when taken as universal in principle." " ln principle!" But 
that insistence, which Husserl reads ( wrongly) in Hegel, is precisely 
what Dilthey refuses to allow. Whether ostensibly necessary truths 
within a system are universally and necessarily necessary in any sys.­
tern is just the question that historicism undermines. For Husserl, 
"necessity" means a priori necessity of (transcendental) constitution. 
Historicism itself need not be presented as a necessary truth in this 
sense; it too is an empirical generalization, and no less powerful a 
claim for that. Even in Hegel, I would argue, the claim cannot be 
made that his "absolute relativism" is itself a necessary truth in Hug, 
serPs strong sense; it is perhaps an inescapable truth, all alternatives to 
it being indefensible. But Hegel's relativism also allows for and hopes 
for ultimate agreement nonetheless. What he refuses is just that dog, 
matic justification of relativism uas universal inprinciple11 that Husserl 
insists upon. But its very application to relativist philosophy begs the 
questiion. If a philosophy denies that principle - including its own 
methodology - can be shown to be "universal in principle," it is 
clearly invalid to argue against it that it cannot prove itself to be 
such.51 
In the Logical Investigations, Husserl had already carried his objec­
tions beyond psychologism to all forms of relativism52 and anticipated 
his later claim53 that "it is easy to see that histodcism, if consistently 
carried through, carries over into extreme skeptical subjectivism." In 
the Logical Investigations, he rejects virtually out of hand what he 
calls "individual relativism"; "individual skepticism is such an explicit 
and - I would almost like to say - impudent or 'fresh' skepticism 
that, if it has ever been seriously advocated, it has certainly not been 
so in modern times. "54 Evidently the sage from Gottingen had not 
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read the nihilist NiettSChe {who had just died that year). But regarding 
what he calls ••  Anthropologism." Husserl insists that it too is a "skep­
tical theory.'' an extremely tempting one, which asserts that "for any 
species of judging being. that is true which, in conformity with the 
being's constitution and laws of thought, has to be regarded as 
true:·ss Husserl goes on to say. "Now this view is self-contradictory ." 
Why? "For its meaning is that the same proposition can be true for 
one being - specifically. a subject of the species homo -and false for 
another being . . .  But the same proposition cannot be both true and 
false. This follows from the mere meaning of the words •true' and 
•false'. "S6 After playing out this argument. Husserl presents us with 
the inevitable result; Relativism is self-contradictory. He scares us 
with the specter that "there would not even be validity to the princi­
ple of contradiction. us7 But the principles that define relativism do 
not themselves have to be presented in absolutist form. Dilthey, in 
particular, was always careful to express his theses in terms of "our 
present limitations". Relativism properly conceived is a form of 
humility, not hubris. It does not seek to replace the absolutism it 
dislodges. 
This picture of Husserl is one-sided. to be sure. No one can be a 
complete reactionary, and it has rightly been pointed outS8 that Hus­
serl, despite his predominant reaction against relativism, also estab­
lished some of the more modern moves that made contemporary 
phenomenological relativism possible. Like Nietzsche, for example, he 
completes the move begun by Kant in eliminating the traditional 
notion of "the given, "59 making "interpretation" (that is, "constitu­
tion'') virtually everything. And the phenomenological program itself, 
despite its heavy Husserlian emphasis on "essences," is precisely that 
"return to subjectivity" that is largely responsible for modern relati­
vism in the first place.60 But although Husserl can be so charted as an 
{unwilling) contributor to the march of modern relativism, his own 
ambitions and the most evident immediate effects of his philosophy 
were exactly the opposite, to urge philosophers to find precisely those 
guarantees of objectivity which would prove relativism to be the 
absurd position that Husserl was certain it was. This was the driving 
force behind phenomenology. 
Husserl's search for the guarantees of objectivity was not satisfying 
to him, however, for the transcendental urge always seemed to need a 
transcendental argument that eluded him - how to warrant the 
extension of the structures he identified in his own experience to 
other people, and ultimately, to all other people. Mid-career, an old 
concern re-emerges with new force, the concern for "inter­
subjectivity" as the mark of objectivity. In Cartesian Meditations, 
inter-subjectivity is argued { more or less) to be a necessary conse­
quence of objectivity. Later on, in Husserl's final work, intersubjectiv­
ity is further argued to be the mark of objectivity.61 This last work 
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betrays other major concessions to relativism. many of which are 
(given Husserl's explicit antipathy to Hegel) embarrassingly Hegelian. 
Most strildngly, historicism now m.alces its appearance within Husserl, 
not as Dilthey's relativism to be sure. but at least as a clear recogni, 
tion of the historical reality of alternative conceptions of knowledge 
and a realization of the difficulties in maintaining one's own concep­
tions as timelessly true. The overly cognitive restrictions of the earlier 
work.s give way to the more existentialist conception of "the lived 
world" (Leberuwelt), another clear concession to Heidegger and 
Schcler, the "ungrateful" students. Many of Husserl's advocates con, 
sider Crisu to be a breakthrough in these respects, incorporating 
within phenomenology the weapons of relativism. I see it rather as a 
breakdown in his philosophy, a last ditch effort to come to terms with 
relativism,. on its own terms, but without giving up the transcendental 
pretense. But the effort failed, for Husserl nowhere succeeded, nor 
could he have succeeded, in turning the relativists' weapons against 
them. He remained knowingly locked into his own phenomenological, 
historical-cultural perspective, and his final conception of the Lebens, 
welt was a partial acknowledgment of this, even if he continued to 
hold up "science" and phenomenology as special opportunities for 
objectivity. But meanwhile, relativism had come of age. It was no 
longer the reduaio ad absurdum villain of philosophy,  and it was no 
longer on the defensive. There were problems, of course, especially 
the threat of •vulgar' relativism and mindless subjectivism, but the 
Hegelian insistence on the •Absolute' gave way to the more radical 
Hegelian insistence on humility and change. Even phenomenology 
charted a new course into unknown waters, and Husserl's best stu­
dents moved away from both his 'egology' and his emphasis on 
apodeictidty. 
Conclusion: The Diminishing Ego in Germanic Philosophy 
It is not within the scope of this essay to follow the fascinating twists 
and turns of European and, in particular, Germanic philosophy as we 
moved into the twentileth century with its Great Wars and the break .. 
down of the old nationalistic boundaries. But the Ego that was so 
celebrated in Kant and expanded to Spirit in Hegel underwent a series 
of even more traumatic changes, beginning, perhaps, with Nietzsche 
(who in many ways is the philosopher who opened up and announced 
the twentieth century ), but then continuing not only through philo­
sophy but in physics- where relativity and uncertainty replaced the 
supposed certainties of the past centuries, in psychology, where the 
human psyche was shown to contain all sorts of dark and hidden 
secrets, and especially in history, where atrocities of the sort never 
dreamed possible by modern 'civilized' humanity ended the optimistic 
Hegelian vision of 'the cunning of history' and replaced it with the 
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despair of an irredeemable irrationalism predicted already by Dos­
toyevski, decades before. 
Santayana charged the Germans with a combination of false humil­
ity, skepticism and arrogance, but it would seem that this combina· 
tion of passions continues throughout the century and not only in 
Germany. Husserl's student Heidegger rejected not only Husserl's 
confidence in phenomenological certainty but indeed the whole of 
Western metaphysics as both a •falling away from Being' and a trans­
cendental pretension that presumes, without justification, that ego so 
readily recognized by the philosophers. But whatever else might be 
said of it - .. brilliant," uobscure,11 etc.- it cannot be said that Hei­
degger 's work is unpretentious or that the conception of the philo­
sopher as savior has no place in it. And yet, Heidegger rejects the 
science-oriented (or •scientific') basis of Husserl's philosophy and 
Western philosophy in general, and he rejects the Cartesian starting 
point of his illustrious predecessors. He denies the ego, preferring to 
couch his analysis in the less self-committed terms of " Da.sein" 
("Being-there' " )  and insists that what philosophers call 'the self is 
either an •empty formal indicator' or a philosophical construction that 
is not warranted by proper phenomenological investigation. 62 Follow­
ing his lead, Jean-Paul Sartre goes on to argue- combining (and con­
fusing) Cartesianism and Heidegger- that consciousness is really 
"nothingness," and the sdf is indeed a creation that emerges through 
life and with interaction with other people. Indeed, it is with Sartre 
that relativism in one sense at least reaches its extreme, in his insist­
ence on ttabsolute freedom" and the inescapable responsibility of the 
individual for everything that he or she is or does.63 But where Hei­
degger increasingly moves away from any form of absolutism in his 
work, ultimately worrying whether ttlanguage can adequately capture 
Being at all," Sartre retains the transcendental pretense in his insist­
en.ce on universal freedom. as essential to human nature and his insist­
ence on the importance of the individual self. Against this, his French 
colleague Maurice Merleau .. Ponty, his colleague Claude Levi-Strauss 
and most recently, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida have attacked 
Sartre's residual confidence in the certainty of the self and the 
unspoken cultural prejudices and presuppositions in philosophy in 
general and in a broad variety of conceptions in history and in litera­
ture too.6• By virtually getting rid of the ego, Foucault and Derrida 
undermine both the traditional claims for subjectivity and the trans, 
cendental pretense. 
Meanwhile, in Germany, Gadamer has continued the "hermeneuti­
cal" tradition initiated by Dilthey and suggested by Heidegger, its 
primary thrust once again to reject the transcendental pretense and 
insist on mutual understanding and dialogue· rather than the single­
handed proof of absolute certainty attempted by Kant and Husserl.65 
At the same time, Jurgen Habermas has been pursuing a theory of 
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"communicative action" toward the same end, to undermine the pret­
ensions of "scientism" and come to understand the systematic distor, 
tions that make us incapable of understanding one another.o6 Indeed, 
one conclusion that might well be drawn from this brief history of the 
Ego in Germanic philosophy is that the entire problem of absolutism 
versus relativism arises with philosophers who are so adamant about 
working alone. In dialogue there may be differences but, so long as the 
conversation continues, neithef' absolutism nor relativism is possible, 
and the more pretentious claims of the ego in Germanic philosophy 
are necessarily tempered by the very unphilosophical and inevitable 
facticity of interpersonal disagreement. It is such a view, I like to 
think, tha·t inspired Santayana, and motivated his harsh but some, 
times insightful attack on the transcendental pretensions of Germanic 
philosophy.67 
Note. 
1 George Santayana, Ego<ism in German Ph1losophJ, New York. 1915,  p.168. 
2 For example, �e Richard Rorty's now infamous address to the Eleventh lnter­
American Congress of Philosophy. in Guadalajara, Mexico, November, 1985 -
reprinted in the Proceedings of the American Philo50phical Association, 1986 (pp. 
747-753) with replies by Thomas Auster and Ofelia Schutte (pp. 753-759). 
More subt.le, but no less dismissive of philosophical diversity, is Donald! David­
son's ••on the Very Idea of a Conceprual Scheme," in the Proceedings, 1974, pp. 
5-20. 
l " . . .  how transitory all human structures are, nay, how oppressive the best institu­
tions become in the course of a few generations." Herder, Ideas towards a Philo­
sopl\'y of the History of Man. 
4 See, for instance, David Carr, Phenomenology and History ('.Evanston, Northwest­
ern 1978). 
� Kemp-Smith, translation (New York: St. Martin's, 1965 ). 
6 E.g., Merleau-Ponty's "Everywhere and Nowhere" in Sign.s. (trans. R. Mcleary, 
Northwestern University Press, 1964 ). 
7 I have worked out this position in some detail in my "Hegel's Epistemology," 
Anvr. Philos. Quart. 1 974, reprinted in From Hegel to Existentialism, Oxford 
Univer.sicy Press, 1987. 
8 Particularly in his Wissenschaftkhre, trans. P. Heath and J.  Lachs, Appleton, Cen· 
tury Crofts, 1970. 
9 Nor did it satisfy Kant. In a harsh "Open Letter" he denounced Fichte's "Kan, 
tianism" and offered a not immodest evaluation of his own work as the founda­
tion of philosophy for centuries to come. 
10 Consider Stace's ill-warranted parody - Hegel (New Yorlc: Dover, 1955) - in 
which he talks of the post-Kantians, despite Kant's arguments, marching 
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"banners flying" cowards prec1sdv che metaphysics Kane had done .away wich 
once and for all. 
1: The Phenomc.'TIOlog:- of �rnd. trans. Ba1ll1C"; "·rieten in 1806. first pul-ltshN m 
1807. cranslanon m English 1 932 ( Macmillan). 
1! Th<"re are serious ontological problems about the meaning of "the same" in 
these concexcs. Since noc only beliefs vary buc concepts as wdl. it is not easy to 
account for such glib claims concerning cross-framework 1d<"nnty. If  there is no 
third inclus1v<" form of consciousness. it can be argued that no such concc.-p< of 
identity could ·c.-ver be made sense of. A modern version of such an argumc.-nt is 
Quine's "radical untranslatability" thesis. Hegd. however. believc.-s that such a 
third inclusive position is virtually always possible. 
• > It is not Hegel who invokes the famous "thesis-antithesis - synthesis" but Kant 
and Fichte. He-gel rarely "schemati:es" his arguments this way. and argues against 
such "schematizing formalism .. in Schelling. 
1 • This is the mysterious "we" tlhat haunts us through Hegel's phenomenology. the 
philosophical overview from which the rehearsal of the dialectic takes place. 
1� Today, consider the recent success of the Castaneda Don Juan tetralogy and the 
enormous interest in Eastern philosophy and occultilsm. It sometimes Sttms as if 
strangeness has become the new criterion of truth, but perhaps I've just been 
spending too much time in California. 
111 Levi-Strauss (among many others) marks out the contrast between the "primi­
tive" and "civilization" on just such grounds. (Struct. Antro.) 
11 Findlay, J. N .. Hegel, A Re-examinarion (NY: Macmillan, 1962). 
18 At the extremes, Hegel's philosophy has been considered the reduction to 
absurdity of the whole of Western rationalist thought. Kierkegaard clearly secs it 
this way (notably in his Joumal.s and Concluding Unscientific PostscTipr). More 
recently, such an interpretation has been argued (not yet published) by Kenley 
Dove. 
19 Kierkegaard, Journals, trans. Dru (Oxford; OUP, 1938 ). 
zo Eirher/Or, trans. Swenson and Lowrie; 2 vols. (Princeton University Press, 
1944 ). 
21 Concluding Un.scientific Postscript, trans. Swenson and Lowrie (Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1941 ). 
22 Marx, German ldeolog,, trans. R. Pascal, (New York 1938 ). 
H Heidegger, however, interprets Nietzsche as "the last of the great 
metaphysicians. 11 
24 Nietzsche, l3eyond Good and Et1il, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Random 
House, 1967 ). 
zs Twilight of the Idols, "Reason in Philosophy" trans. W. Kaufmann, (in Viking 
Portable Niettsehe (New York: Vik ing, 1954) "Reason in Philosophy", ii. 
26 The Will co Power, trans. W. Kaufmann, (New York: Random House, 1967) 
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1' lbld. S07. 
� Ibid. 540. 
>C N1ctz5ehc, Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufmann ( New York: Random House. 1975� 
,. Will co P�v:r. +93. 
>1 Ibid. 410. 
n But winning evidently isn't "absolute"; in ZaTathnutra and elsewhere, Nienscht 
ominously portrays the idea of the "tyranny of the weak" and the defeat of tht 
"hi� men." 
J-4 Dilthey, The fasence of Ph1losophJ, trans. S. A .  and W. T. Emery, (Chapel Hill, 
N .C . . U. North Carolina Press, 1954 ). 
�� For a more detailed examination of this idea, see Peter Krausser's "Dilthey's 
Revolution . .. " (Review of MetaphJsicJ, Dec., 1968, Vol. XXll, pp. 261-280). 
>6 Quoted in Holbom, "Dilthey and Historical Reason," in Wagar, et al., Europe in 
Hiscory Since Darwin and Man, New Yorlc: Har 1966). p. 74. 
H Ibid. 
l8 I want' to specially thanlc Alex von Schocbom for his hdpful criticism and dis­
cussion of this Stt ion. 
l9 In "Philo$0phy and the Crisis of European Man", trans. Q. Lauer, Phenomenol­
OgJ and the Crisis in Philosophy(New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 178. 
40 "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", in Lauer, op. cit. p. 146. 
41 Philosophie der Arithmetik (Halle; Pfeffer, 1891 ). 
42 Fregc ·reviewed Husserl's Philosophie der Arithmetik in 1894. 
4l Logical ln...esrigarions, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities, 1970), 
Foreword. 
44 It has been well-argued by E. Tugendhat (Die Wahrheiubegriff bei Husserl und 
Heidlgger) that the seeds of relativism remain at the very· basis of Husserl's phe­
nomenology, even in his strongly anti-rela.tivist writings. He argues that because 
Husserl's theory of the a priori is "grounded in the material content of expe­
rience" rather than in the structure of the conscious subject (as in Kant), the 
possibility of alternative modes of experience carries with it the possibility of 
alternative a priori systems as well. Necessary truths, in other words, are always 
relative to a given mode of experience. But however latent in Husserl's philo­
sophy, this possibility is never explicitly acknowledged or accepted by him. It 
shows. however, that even the most conscientious Absolutist, beginning from 
the subjective standpoint, may or perhaps. must find himself nurturing the ele­
of the very position he seeks most energetically to refute. (See Tugendhat, p. 
163f, 183f. Cf. Husserl's Cartesian Meditations trans. Cairns (Hague: Nijhoff, 
1960), section 90. 
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• The correspondence theory of truth 1s normally concerneJ with a tht"'ory of 
"represemauon .. or of "ndnenc<." It is important to not< that Husscrl's appeal 
to "correspondence." r-c:cau� of his accep<an<e of the crucial Frt>gean J1snnc­
uons below. ts far more complex - not a corr('spondrnc(' bt"rw«n "subj('("ti\"(' .. 
and "obJective" or language and the world l-ut N-tween two difft>rt"nt forms of 
"obJt"Cttve correlatt"s." (See. for example. !dew. Chs. l and 9). His latt" u.·ork The 
Cmu of rhc European Sc1c:'TI1..·e:s. trans. D. Carr (North western. 1970) adds to this 
che disoncnon bt"'rween the "livt"d world " of given experienct" and the "objecti­
fit"d world" of 1dcah:t"d construction on that experit"nce. But Husse-rl's thC'ory of 
truth. as he states 1t. does not appear in etther case to be of the correspondt"nce 
variety: for him. tTuth is always "original givC'ness". a return to Descartes' t� 
of "clear and distinct" criterion. But it is important to remem� -and it 
unmasks a great deal of obscurity to do so - that what is "�iven" iin this senSC" is 
prt"cisely the "correlate" which every "corrt"spondence"- type theory of truth 
requires. 
4e Ideas. trans. W. R .  Boyce..Cibson (Nt"w York: Macmillan. 1958) t"Sp. Ch. l .  
•7 One would like co say "ontology," except that the ontological status of these 
entities is. by Husserl's own insistence, exceptionally unclear. 
•8 Notably, Alexi us Meinong. in his Theory of Objec..--u. had inventt"d an ontology of 
meani ngs and references so extravagant that Bt"rtrand RuSSt'll could launch his 
career by ridiculing it. 
·•Q "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science". Lauer op cit. p. 77. 
� Ibid. 
·�1 Cf. LoRical ln\leStiRations, Vol I ,  Ch. 7. sect. 34: Ideas. Ch. 2, Cartesian Medita· 
rion.s, Med. 1 .  
·sz Vol. 1 .  Ch. 7 .  
·SJ "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", p. 125.  
�· Logical lnvestiRacions, Vol. 1 ,  Sect. 35. 
-SS Ibid. 36. 
'S6 Ibid. 
s1 "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", p. 125 .  
:sa See Tugendhat, op. cit. 
59 Ibid. 
60 This is not to say that relativism is necessarily a product of subjectivism. This is 
half of the story. But the other half is just as important; it was the .. objectivity" 
findings of anthropology and explorations that provided (and still provides) the 
most powerful incentives to belief in the actual existence of alternative forms of 
consciousness. 
6I Crisis, op cit; it has not been established that Husserl ever went so far as to 
insist, as Merleau-Ponty claims that he did, that " intersubjectivicy is objective." 
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62 M .  HndC1CF'f. &ing and Time. trans. Macquarrie and Robmson. Harper & Rov." 
1962. 
&} J. P. Sartre. Th.t T"aructndLnct of w Ego. trans. F. W1lharns. Noonday. 1957. 
Bnn.g and NoclunpcSJ. trans. H. Bar�. Philosophical Library, 1956. 
M M .  Mnkau,Ponry . Smse and N�. trans. H. and P. Drt>Yfus, Northwestern 
Univcnity Presa, 1964. M. Foucault, The OTdn of Tlungs. Random House. 
I 970. J. Derrida, Of Grammatoloo. rrans. G. Spivak, Johns Hopkins, 1 976. 
M H. Gadamtt, T nail and Method, trans. G. Barden and J .  Cumming, Seabury, 
1975. 
66 J. Habermat, Krwwledgt CI1'd Human ln.rnesu, Btacon, 197 1 .  A T� of Comm". 
nicati'-"t Action, Vol. I, trans. T. McCarthy, MIT Press, 1984. 
67 The arguments and analyses of this essay have subscqucndy bttn d�dopcd and 
expanded in Continenial Phil.osoph., since 1 no: The Rise and Fall of ihe Self 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 988). 
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